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AN INQUIRY CONCERNING JUSTICE.66TUSTICE," said Daniel Webster, "is the greatest interest of
F man on earth."
Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist, declared "Justice is
the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It has ever been,
and ever will be, pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost
in the pursuit."
Fiat jistitia, ruat coelum,--Let there be justice though the
heavens fall, has been crystalized into a maxim.
We often call our courts, courts of justice. Lawyers are termed
officers of justice. The function of the whole judicial machinery of
the state is said to be the administration of justice. We speak frequently, in dealing with legal matters, of "natural justice" and
often of "abstract justice." We also distinguish often between
"legal justice," or that which is administered between the parties
to an action by the courts, and "social justice," or that which regulates the rights, privileges and duties of individuals considered as
members of society.
We distinguish sometimes bet~ween "restorative justice" and "distributive justice",-a distinction which has the same foundation as
that first mentioned, namely, justice administered by the judicial machinery which restores a man: to his proper rights, and the justice
which attends the distribution among men of the rights, privileges,
immunities, duties and obligations which belong to them as members of society.
We also distinguish between "reparative justice" and "retributive
justice," or that which, on the one hand, secures to the deserving
man his dues, and, on the other, to the undeserving man his deserts.
In this sense, we pray for justice for ourselves and threaten it to
our enemies.
This importance of the subject and this frequency of use would
A paper read as the annual address before the State Bar Association of Nebraska
in December, igiS.
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naturally lead one to believe either that there is an established
definition of justice or at any rate that a workable definition of
justice is capable of being agreed upon. As said by Professor
Ritchie in his book on "Natural Rights," in dealing with the subject
of justice, laws and the State: "The man who speaks in the law
courts or political assemblies speaks as if lie knew what these terms
meant." What, then, does justice mean? How is it to be defined?
Now, I am not so unwise as to believe that everything which
exists is capable of being defined. For example, I -believe that there
is such a thing as life, but, so far as I know, no one has ever been
able to'give a satisfactory definition of it. We speak often of the
"good", but what is "good"? Is it capable of being defined, or can
we deal with it only relatively in comparison with other subjects?
The age-old question which Pilate asked,-"What is truth?" remains still essentially unanswered, although upon every judicial trial
every witness is sworn to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth." Nothing, it has been said, is more fascinating than
the attempt to define the virtues, but nothing is more difficult.
Perhaps the same difficulty inheres in the case of justice. Is
justice capable of being defined? Many attempts certainly have
been made to define it, and a brief review of some of them, culled
from wide sources and different times, may throw some light upon
the problem. The opening paragraph of Justinian's Institutes declares "fustitia est constans et perpetua v'ohntas jus snum cuique
tribuendi,"-Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render
every man his due.
Almost the whole of Plato's "'Republic" is made up of the discussions which Socrates and his friends are reported to have had concerning the nature of justice. Evefitually, in the discussion, justice
comes to have a very general significance, being largely identified
with virtue. But in the course of the discussion respecting the
standard appealed to in the trial of causes before the courts, the
question is asked,-"And are suits decided on any other ground but
that a man may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of
what is his own". And the answer is, "Yes, that is their principle."
"It is a just principle?" "Yes." "Then on this view also justice
will be admitted to be the having and enjoying what is a man's
owns' and belongs to him?" "Very true."
James Martineau, in his "Types of Ethical Theory," says, "Justice
is the treatment of persons according to their deserts."
Herbert Spencer, in working out his "Synthetic Philosophy," devotes a volume to the consideration of Justice, as a part of Ethics.
He attempts to show that even animals have standards by which they
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determine the quality of actions, and that they punish the members
of the animal group that violate the standard. The essence of this
standard is that animals shall have and do in accordance with their
nature and functions. He then proceeds to develop the idea, of a
subhuman justice, (which expands as the animal organization becomes higher), that animals shall have and be what their nature and
inherent qualities may warrant. Working upward to men, 'he discovers first a "sentiment of justice", developing later into an "idea
of justice" that every man should have what his inherent nature and
conduct may merit. This, however, must be modified by the equal
right of every other man, and this combination, stated in its affirmative form, Mr. Spencer develops into a "formula of justice" which
is that "Every man is free to do that which 'he wills, provided he
infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."
President Wayland, in his 'book on the "Elements of Moral Science," written many years ago, declares that justice, when used in
the sense in which we are now considering it, "signifies that temper
of mind which disposes a man to administer rewards and punishments according to the character and actions of the object."
President Fairchild, in his book on "Moral Philosophy", published
near the middle of the last century, declares that justice as a virtue
is but another name for benevolence dealing with the interests and
deserts of man. "There is an impulse to treat every interest according to its value and every person according to his deserts, and there
is satisfaction in witnessing-such a result. This characteristic of our
nature is often called the principle of justice, but it becomes the
virtue of justice when benevolence enters in to regulate and limit
it. What is called justice becomes sin when it goes beyond the
limits which benevolence appoints."
Professor Lorimer, in his "Institutes of Law," though he works
out a very elaborate scheme of natural rights, much the same as that
of Mr. Spencer, contends that justice and charity are identical; that
their separate realization is impossible, and that their common realization necessarily culminates in the same action.
John Austin, quoting the statement of Hobbes that "no law can
be unjust", (which he explains as meaning that "no positive law is
legally unjust") declares that justice, when used with reference to
legal matters, can mean no more and no Jess than conformity to the
existing law.
Mr. James C. Carter, in his book on "Law, its Origin, Growth and
Function," asks "What is justice?" saying that there has been much
uncertainty upon the point; that to some it seems to import a sublime
attribute, almost an emanation of the Deity, recognizable by an innate
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moral sense, while to others it means no more than an expression of
what is right or what ought to be done; and he declares that the
attempt to form a conception of some absolute attribute which would
properly be named justice is an abortive one. He concludes that
"justice consists in the compliance with custom in all matters, of
differences between men."
Professor Pattee in his book on the "Essential Nature of Law,"
adopts as the definition of justice substantially that of Justinian,
though he insists that it has both its subjective and objective sides,
and is not 6omplete unless the desire to render to everyone his due
is accomplished objectively by securing that it be done.
Professor Paul Elmer More, in his recent "Essays on Aristocracy
and Justice," declares that, in a way, justice is easily defined. "It is
_ the act of right distribution; the giving to each man his due," though
he proceeds to point out, what must hereafter be more fully emphasized, that such a definition does not carry us very far until some of
its terms have themselves been defined.
Professor Sidgwick, in his book on the "Methods of Ethics," devotes a chapter to a very discriminating and interesting discussion
of the nature and formula of justice. After pointing out that, in
many cases, justice seems to consist of equality among all of a given
class and impartiality in dealing with them, he proposes "as the
principle of ideal justice,, so far as this can be practically aimed at
in human society, the requital of voluntary services in proportion to
their worth." In concluding his chapter, he says: "The results of
this examination of Justice may be summed up as follows. The
prominent element in Justice as ordinarily conceived is a kind of
equality; that is, impartiality in the observance or enforcement of
certain general rules allotting good or evil to individuals. But when
we have clearly distinguished this element, we see that the definition
of the virtue required for practical guidance is left obviously incomplete. Inquiring further for the right general principles of distribution, we find that our common notion of Justice includes-besides
the principle of reparation for injury-two quite distinct and divergent elements. The one, which we may call conservative justice, is
realized (i) in the observance of law and contracts and definite
understandings, and in the enforcement of such penalties for the
violation of these as have been legally determined and announced;
and (2) in the fulfilment of natural and normal expectations. The
latter obligation, however, is of a somewhat indefinite kind. But the
other element, which we have called ideal justice, is still more difficult to define; for there seem to be two quite distinct conceptions of
it, embodied respectively in what we have called the individualistic
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and the socialistic ideals of a political community. The first of these
takes the realization of freedom as the ultimate end and standard of
right social relations; but on examining it closer we find that the
notion of freedom will not give a practicable basis for social construction without certain arbitrary definitions and limitations, and
even if we admit these, still a society in which freedom is realized
as far as is feasible does not completely suit our sense of justice.
Prima facie, this is more satisfied by the socialistic ideal of distribution, founded on the principle of requiting deserts, but when we try
to make the principle precise, we find ourselves again involved in
grave difficulties; and similar perplexities beset the working out of
rules of criminal justice on the same principle."
Professor Willoughby, in his book on "Social Justice," contends
that there are no absolute rights, and, defining Justice as the rendering to each individual, so far as possible, of the opportunity for a
realization of his highest ethical sel-f,--including therein the general
duty of all, in the pursuit of their own ends, to recognize others as
individuals who are striving for, and have a right to strive for, the
similar realization of their own ends,-concludes that it is impossible
to formulate any definite principle or to frame any absolute rules of
justice.
An encyclopoedia writer (The New International) says that
"Moral justice may, perhaps, be defined as allowing each man such
freedom of action, security of possession, and realization of expectations based on custom, as are compatible with the welfare of society"; but, he says, "There is no such thing as an absolute justice if
by that is meant any particular method of treatment which any man
has a right to expect of society, regardless of the times in which he
lives and of the character of his life."
Professor Carver, in his recent "Essays in Social Justice," approaches the question from an entirely different standpoint, namely
the standpoint of the State and its functions, and declares that in
its most general terms, "justice may be defined as such an adjustment of the conflicting interests of the citizens of a nation as will
interfere least with and contribute most to the strength of the
nation."
And, finally, in these days, we hear much of a "new morality," and
of a "new justice". The characteristic of this new justice is said to be
the expansion of the spirit of collectivism instead of individualism,
the promotion of the feeling of co6peration, "the exercise by society
of its collective powers in support of the legitimate claims of individual life." Its formula is, "To every man according to his
needs", rather than "to every man according to his deserts".
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As declared in Dewey and Tufts' "Ethics," "The old justice, in
the economic field, consisted chiefly in securing to each individual
his rights in property or contracts. The new justice must consider
how it can secure for each individual a standard of living, and such
a share in the values of civilization, as shall make possible a full
moral life".
.Such quotations might be indefinitely extended but it would serve
no useful purpose. Enough have been quoted to show that among
the older writers at least, justice was thought to bear a close relation to merit, and might be epitomized in the common formula, "To
every man according to his deserts". Upon the theory that desert
should not be passive, but that every one should strive to achieve, it
is often said that the formula should be, "To every man according
to his effort". Without any great violence to its form, perhaps,
though it leads to different results, it might be said that every man
deserves to have what his strength and nature entitle him to secure;
and therefore the formula of justice should be transformed to read,"To every man according to his strength", or "To every man according to his might". Recently a different conception has been advanced, which may perhaps be thought to lie implicitly.in the older
statements, though this also leads to a still different conclusion.
Every man deserves to have what his inherent nature demands; the
matter should therefore be approached from the standard of his
needs, and the formula then becomes,---"To every man according
to his needs".
No short formula, however, such as any one of these, can do more
than express a general thought, and, while it may perhaps serve
as a general principle of action, it can not be of much aid in the
determination of particular controversies until much more has been
agreed upon. As Professor More has pointed out, if we define
justice as the act of right distribution, what do we mean by right?
Or if we say that justice consists in giving to every man his due,
how shall we determine what is due to him? Have we any general
principle by which these inevitable questions can be answered? If all
that we have done is to conclude that it is just that a man shall
have what it is right for him to have, or that he shall have what he
deserves, what shall be our formula as to right and desert? U fortunately, for either of these questions we have no short and conclusive answer, and the determination of them, if they can be determined at all, would take us into wide and disputed fields.
Must we then conclude that, notwithstanding all that has been
said about the importance and supremacy of justice, and the function
of law and courts and lawyers in securing it, we nevertheless have
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no definite principles to guide us and no certain formula by which
we can discover what we seek? If that be the conclusion, then it
may be urged that our courts have been misnamed and that the
end for which we seek is a vague and unattainable one.
It must probably be confessed that we have no precise and definite
conception of justice, and it is certainly true that, whatever may be
our ideal, we are unable to frame any formula of justice which shall
be at once concise and definite and, at the same time, accurately inclusive and exclusive.
Notwithstanding that, however, I think we are not ready to concede that there'is no such thing as justice, or that we are not able, in
many cases at any rate, to form a concept of it which 'will furnish
us with at least a general principle of conduct. As we search for
it, more and more, we may be compelled to revise our statements
and enlarge our views. We may not find it so simple as we thought,
but it may be really a happy thing, nevertheless, if we are compelled
to leave the boundaries always open for the reception of new ideas.
I.
Before coming to any final conclusion, however, respecting the
administration of justice in our courts, it may be desirable to point
out that, although our courts are commonly spoken of as courts of
justice, and though they may have been that in origin, they are
not now, distinctly and merely, courts of justice at all, 'but are courts
of law. Courts may undoubtedly exist without any formulated body
of law, and primitive courts were unquestionably of that sort. It
seems, however, to be a natural if not an inevitable process for courts
to develop into courts of law, as the justice administered in individual cases crystalizes into justice administered in classes of cases.
Moreover, if we will stop to think about it, we shall see that a vast
portion of our law has and can have no necessary relation to any
abstract principle of justice at all. It is a growth or development of
the rules, sometimes arbitrary, sometimes accidental, sometimes based
on custom, sometimes on mere convenience, which in the course of
many years have been developed to regulate the affairs of men with
reference to matters which involve no moral element. Paradoxical
as it may seem, it is true with reference to a vast portion of our law,
that if the original rule had been precisely the opposite of the one
adopted, justice would have been in no sense violated and convenience might have been as fully served. Take, for example, our vast
body of rules respecting land and interests therein and titles thereto
and the transfer of such interests or titles. While the question of
any ownership of land may involve a moral element, the particular
forms of titles and estates and the rules of procedure which may
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happen to prevail in any given system or at any particular time may
involve no question of justice at all, beyond the fact that, when once
they-have been agreed upon, it will be just that they shall be observed
until they have been duly changed.
Our vast and complicated body of corporation law presents the
same aspect. The bulk of it is made up of a mass of rules and regudifferent countries and under different systems, and which might in
many respects be altered at pleasure without doing injustice, except
where it would disturb dealings already had in reliance upon the continuance of the present rule. The whole body of corporation law
might be repealed and do, no injustice to future generations,. that iF
to those not already involved in reliance upon the rules which happen
to prevail. The same thing is true about our great volume of law
respecting negotiable paper. Justice would not have suffered if there
had never been such a mass of rules developed. Many of the rules,
are, in origin, mere matters of custom and convenience. No moral
principle is involved in the question whether notice of dishonor shall
be given within twenty-four hours or forty-eight hours. If we are to
play the game we must observe the rules, but justice in most cases
goes no further than that. An excellent and familiar illustration is
to be found in the rule of the road. In this country we turn to the
right when meeting a person or a vehicle. In England they turn to
the left under similar ciricumstances. No moral element is involved,
except in seeing that all observe the same rule.- Many other illustrations will instantly come to mind, but it is not necessary to enumerate them. In this sense, therefore, the function of our courts is to
administer the law and not to administer justice. More than this, any
attempt in such cases to appeal to an abstract or any other sense of
justice, in defiance of the rules established, would result in chaos
and produce injustice rather than justice.
On 'the other hand, there are cases in which the moral element is
involved. The question of crime and its punishment involves many.
Many of the questions arising in the field of tort certainly have a
moral content, as will be readily seen, although there are still many
questions in this field, like most of those falling under the prolific
head of negligence, which have no other moral aspect than conformity to the habits and standards of the community, whatever they
may chance to be, when once they have become established. The
question also of the performance of promises may involve a moral
aspect, though the vast mass of our rules respecting the form of the
contract, the necessity of writing, the capacity of the parties, the
necessity of consideration, and the like, may involve none.
A single illustration from the tort field may serve to show how
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even a general formula of justice may be appealed to. It has been
much disputed in very recent years, particularly in the matter of
employers' liability, as to what are the lawful limitations of liability
without fault. Much of the discussion, unfortunately, has concerned
itself with the mere question of the constitutionality of the statutes
imposing such a liability, rather than with the justice of such a rule.
A very general sentiment of justice may here suffice. If there 'be anything in the instinctive sentiments of animals and men, it shows itself
in the repudiation of responsibility where no wrong can be imputed.
Even the dog seems to distinguish between merited punishment and
being beaten for acts he did not commit. The child's breast swells
with injustice upon being condemned for that which he was not
morally responsible, and even so general a formula of justice as "To
every man according to his deserts", is sufficient to condemn any
general conclusion that a man may be held liable without fault, and
to brand as sophistical and inconclusive the alleged considerations
of policy or otherwise which seek to justify it.
The fact that there are already in our law a number of cases in
which men are held liable without fault, seems neither to furnish
proof of the justice of the case, nor reason why the number of such
cases should be increased. The common law, for example, while it
had a less rigorous rule to secure the safety of passengers, held the
common carrier of goods to a degree of liability which made him
practically the insurer of their safety. This rule was thought to be
justified by considerations of policy at the time of its establishment,
but that such a rule is just under all circumstances in modem times
I suppose no one would contend. The common law liability of the
master for the acts of his servant has been carried to a degree which
I suppose practically every considerate person would now concede
to be unjust, although many considerations of policy and otherwise
are advanced to support it. Other instances might be mentioned,
but it is not necessary for the presentpurpose. The principle, however, is important. The danger of violating it is insidious. -The
excuse is usually that it is merely applying or extending an already
established doctrine. We need to remember, as has already been
stated, that the mere fact that some unjust rules have been allowed,
to creep into our law certainly furnishes no reason why we should
have more.
It is, of course, to be conceded that nearly all general rules, however just their application may ordinarily be, will occasionally, in a
given case, work injustice. This is undoubtedly much to be deplored,
though it is probably not to be avoided if the rule is to be maintained. The evil consequence of attempting to introduce some per-
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sonal or temporary exception in order to avoid the operation of such
a general rule, because it will work injustice in a particular case, is
well recognized, and often finds expression in the familiar adage
that "Hard cases make bad law". No system of law, moreover,
attempts to enforce all just conclusions by law. The alleged maxim
that wherever there is a right there must be a remedy does not mean
that wherever there is a moral right there must be a legal remedy.
Many rights are left to other than legal machinery for enforcement.
The institution, peculiar to our system, of a separate court of
equity has furnished many opportunities for doing justice in cases
to which the legal rule did not extend or in which for some reason
the operation of the legal rule could be avoided. Whatever they may
have been in their origin, however, our courts of equity have long
ceased to be tribunals in which purely equitable considerations applicable only to a particular case may find expression. Rightly or
wrongly, our courts of equity tend to become courts administering
what is called equity in accordance with more or less general rules,
and they rarely venture in these days to strike out into wholly new
fields.
It is sometimes urged that our courts of law should adopt more
fully 'the ideas originally underlying the administration of equity,
or, at any rate, that judges should be clothed with and should exercise
a very much wider degree of discretion for the furtherance of justice
in particular cases than they now possess and exercise. While
there are undoubtedly cases in which a greater degree of discretion
might safely be exercised, two considerations at least seem at present
to stand in the way of the wide adoption of such a rule. One is that
both in England and America there is a deep rooted and long standing distrust of any large degree of discretionary power vested in any
official or tribunal; and the second is 'that discretion in the determination of the rights and liabilities which arise from ordinary business
transactions is fatal to the continuance of any widespread' business
dealings among men. Dealings involving faith or credit in the future
can only thrive where some more or less definitely settled rule, rather
than mere discretion, is to determine what the future shall bring
- forth.
Even if it should be agreed that certain existing rules of law
were unjust, it would not ordinarily be within the province of courts
to change them when once they have become established. Courts do,
of course, occasionally overturn rules established by judicial decisions, and it is perhaps true that they ought to do it more frequently than they do, but the evil effects of an e.x post facto change
of an established rule-and this is practically the only way in which
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courts can deal with it-are so obvious that courts are naturally
reluctant to undertake it. With respect of rules laid down by the
legislature, courts will practically never attempt to change them
because they are thought to be unjust, nor will the courts refuse to
enforce new statutes for that reason, unless the legislature is found
to have exceeded its constitutional authority.
II.
But it is not alone in the administration of law in courts that
justice is essential, although this is the field that concerns the law
as a profession most strictly. Back of law and courts and lawyers
are the great facts of life and living. There is the great fact which
we call the existence and organization of society,-the fact that in
all civilized communities at least, men live and are forced to live
under and subject to rules, regulations and traditions which control
their lives and conduct in such an inexorable manner that few, if
any, can escape them. Widespreading, longstanding and apparently
all-powerful traditions or institutions have become established, which
mould and control the lives and activities of men, not only from
birth to death, but not infrequently long before birth and long after
death. The institutions of government, of family, of law, of property, of inheritance, of social order, and the like, all affect and influence, if they do not control, the lives, the activities and the aspirations of the human beings who are subject to them. If justice be
essential in the ordinary administration of law in courts, how equally
is it essential that in the formation and operation of these institutions the rules of justice should be observed. It is to this field that
the more or less vague and much abused expression "social justice"
applies.
Although, as has been stated, the lawyer's immediate field may be
thought to be the administration of justice in the courts, his interest
in this other field can be only secondary, not only because as a
human being he also is subject to the institutions which may prevail,
but because of the fact that, from the beginning of our government
to the present, lawyers have always taken a leading, if not a predominating, part in legislation and government.
It will be obvious at once that we have here an entirely different
situation, characterized by wholly different and less definite procedure. In the field of ordinary law, if an individual believes that his
right has been denied him, or injustice has been done him by some
other individual, he finds ready to his hand certain and definite machinery by which he may bring the question to a determination. Here
are courts and officers and process, of which he may freely avail
himself, and through which he may hope to gecure justice. But in
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the other field how different is the situation! The individual, who
feels that he is deprived of -his right by the operation of the existing
institutions of society, can find nowhere ready to his hand any
tribunal whose duty it is to hear his complaint, and which is clothed
with power to grant him the necessary relief. The evil that he complains of may go to -the root of all existing legal institutions. Even
if he complains, his voice may seem to be merely that of one crying
in the wilderness, and if there be any tribunal to which he may
appeal, it is merely to the vague, largely unorganized, uncertain, slow
tribunal of public opinion. To such a tribunal the single man or
everi large numbers of men may often appeal in vain, as the whole
history of human progress demonstrates. In despair of making
himself otherwise heard, he may resort to violence, revolution or
the destruction of institutions.
Notwithstanding all the difficulties involved, there can be no general and permanent justice among men unless there be justice in
these fundamental relktions and institutions which control their lives
and fortunes. It is here that the greatest dissatisfaction is being
manifested at the present moment. Many people, in many places,
are calling loudly for what they term justice. Part of them, it is
obvious, have no definite idea in mind. It is merely a "vague unrest", a "nameless longing" which fills their breast. Others have,
if not a principle, at least a program. Others, still, are searching with
real insight and sympathetic interest into the situation, and are
seeking to find a remedy. Unfortunately, some of these are tempted
to proclaim the remedy before they have really found it. Many of
the proposed remedies will not bear analysis. . Nevertheless, the
problem must be confronted. What is meant by justice in this
field? Unfortunately, our concepts are here less definite than they
were in the field of judicial justice, and the whole situation makes
a formula of justice still more difficult to agree upon than it is in
that field. In the field of judicial justice we may get one man separated from his fellows, the opposite party will be definite and
certain; the issue will be concise and capable of being framed into
some specific demand; but in the field of so called social justice the
complainants may be whole masses of men, smarting under a sense
of injustice, but with no definite antagonist and with no claims that
can as yet be made certain and specific.
As has been stated,, a great variety of conceptions and formulas
of justice have been formed and stated for this field, and several of
those referred to in the earlier part of this discussion have been
those which were primarily intended to operate here. They involve
the whole question of the organization of Society, the nature and
function .of the State, the nature of rights,-whether natural or
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legal, -the
foundation of institutions like marriage, or the right
of private property, or the right of inheritance. These questions
have been the fruitful subject of controversy and discussion since
man became conscious of them and of their influence upon his life
and happiness. Vast speculation has been indulged in, and scores
of volumes written, concerning the nature of man and his claim to
what are termed "rights". Equally prolific has been the discussion
respecting the origin and nature and function of the State. A great
variety of theories have been promulgated, each of which has had
its adherents, all ready to insist that the adoption of their particular,
theory would solve the problems of human life and happiness. Individualism, collectivism, utilitarianism, socialism, communism, anarchism-all have had their advocates. In a large measure the controversy, as nearly as it can be stated in a word, has been whether
Society makes man, or whether man makes Society. At one time
the individualistic organization of society has seemed to be in the
ascendancy, while in another the socialistic or collectivistic form has
promised to prevail.
How far apart these two conceptions are, may perhaps be shown
by contrasting one of the classical statements of the principle of individualism with some of the principles declared in more recent
times. In 1859 John Stuart Mill published his famous "Essay on
Liberty". "The object of this essay", he said, "is to assert one very
simple principle as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control,
whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is,
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection; that the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a- civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warranty. He can
not rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will- be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because,
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right."
I "These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he does otherwise.
To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him
must be calculated to produce evil to.someone else. The only part
of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him-
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self, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
As against this, the principle, so freely asserted in modern times,
that what is called Society or the State may coerce the individual,
control his method of living, restrict his hours of labor, and restrain
his power of contract, not merely for the general good, but also
for his own, furnishes a very striking contrast.
I have no desire, nor would the present hour afford the time, to
consider at length the many modern problems which such a difference of view presents. I must content myself with referring to but
two or three, and then only so far as to point out some of the larger
questions of justice which are involved.
Take, for example, the question of the justice of private ownership
of land. Over this question has raged a long controversy, which is
by no means at an end. It has often been and still is contended that
private ownership of land is neither just nor expedient. Those who
have it are frequently termed "robbers", and the demand is made
that Society or the State shall dispossess these robbers; and, because all of the present holders are either themselves robbers or because their holdings originated in robbery by someone else, it is insisted that Society, in appropriating the land, need make no compensation to the present holders, however much they may have acquired
it in actual good faith and for value in reliance upon existing laws
and usages of Society.
In a recent discussion in the public press, one writer contended,
that, while something could be said, in the distribution of the
products of industry, for a return to capital and management as well
as to labor, nothing could -be said for any return to the owners of
the land. I do not desire to enter into any extended discussion of
this question, and, indeed, I believe that the weight of modern
opinion is against any general right of the state to appropriate the
land without compensation to the present owners. As bearing upon
the justice of any such claim to appropriate without compensation, I
wish merely to call attention to what has been going on in this
country from the beginning, and especially to events a large part of
which have actually transpired within my lifetime. Soon after the
establishment of the Federal Government, the .United States came
into what was claimed to be the unquestioned ownership of large
tracts of unoccupied land in the West and Northwest. This area
was increased by the Louisiana Purchase, by the events following
the war with Mexico, arid by discovery and settlement in the
Northwest, until the United States came to be the so-called owner
of a vast territory of unoccupied and unproductive public land.
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To secure settlers to develop this land was thought to be a matter
of great public importance, and became the subject of a settled
public policy. Settlers were invited to enter upon, occupy and improve it. Immigration was welcomed. Railroads and other highways were encouraged to make the territory accessible and hasten
its settlement, and their projectors were often offered portions of
the land if they would raise the money and construct their works.
Interests in it were offered as 'bounties or compensation to soldiers
and sailors for their patriotic services in times of war. To all these,
the government offered to transfer a so-called absolute title to the
land, which title the government purported to assure to the settler
and to his heirs and assigns forever. Acting upon these invitations
hundreds of thousands of men and women entered upon the endeavor
to settle and improve the country. Leaving their homes and associations in the east, cutting themselves off not infrequently from
friends and society, exposing themselves often to attacks by'savage
Indians, braving the diseases and discomforts incident to a new
territory, they took upon themselves all the hardships and privations
of the pioneer. They subdued forests, removed stones from fields,
drained svamps, built roads and bridges, created governments, erected school houses and churches, built towns and villages, established
society, and in general performed all the labor and endured all the
'sacrifices necessary to change an unsettled waste into established communities fitted to maintain life and to sustain and promote human
society. To even make life tolerable, to give any value to the land
and to make a place fit for habitation for succeediig generations;
more than one generation of pioneers expended its life and strength.
We have all seen them, these pioneers, horny-handed and bent of
back, laboriously toiling to make a civilized community where otherwise there would be 'but a wilderness. All this they did in reliance
upon the solemn assurances of the highest authorities in the nation
that, when they had complied with the conditions which the nation
prescribed, the land which they had thus transformed from a wilderness should belong to them and to their posterity. Now, whatever
may be thought about the abstract right of the government to own
this land, or the attempt to transfer ownership to individuals, to say
that those who have acquired it and given to it its value under circumstances such as these are to be denominated robbers, and to be
summarily ejected without compensation, is at least a startling proposition and one which makes very little appeal to any sense of justice,
rudimentary or refined, which it is possible to entertain. Upon this
question I quote from a recent book by a writer who certainly cannot be denominated a "reactionary" or "hide-bound conservative"-

HeinOnline -- 14 Mich. L. Rev. 375 1915-1916

MICHIGAN LAW REVI.4W

Professor Jethro Brown, in the "Underlying Principles of Modern
Legislation,"-"Nor can I see how the State can be justified. in ignoring those rights of property which individuals have acquired in the
past -with its express approval and positive sanction. The State may
have erred in parting with the freehold of the land; some people
may possess too much land and some people too little; and the time
may have come to substitute public for private ownership of land.
But, in seeking to effect reforms in these directions, the State must
be loyal to the moral obligations it has incurred in the past."
The question of the amount which -that which we call "labor"
may justly take from the results of industry, or, in other words, the
wages which labor may justly demand, is another of the matters
concerning which it is contended tlhat the present rules and institutions of society do not establish justice. I personally believe that
this contention is in large measure well founded, but the determination of -what plortion justice demands, is by no means easy. If we
take for our principle that justice demands that to "Every man shall
be given what he deserves or what is his due", bow shall we determine what this amount is? It is of course possible, if one accepts
the extreme views often put forward, that labor is entitled to all
of it, to make short work of the problem; but if we do not accept
this extreme view, and demand some basis of just distribution, the
question at once arises, What shall that ,basis be? In general, it .has
long been and still is the prevailing view of the civilized world that
a thing is worth what it will bring when exposed to competitive sale
in the public markets. This has been and, in general, still is the
accepted view with reference to the value of labor; 'but of recent
years there have been many claims that it is unjust to labor to submit
its just share to this form of competition, and a variety of efforts
have been made, chiefly in the'form of labor unions, which should by
one means or another prevent competition, to establish a different
basis for determining compensation. That this method has produced some improvements can not be denied, but that it is a satisfactory method can not be asserted. It often leads to violence and
oppression, and results in much partiality and inconsistency. At the
present moment, for example, it is insisted that persons who furnish
labor may be freed from the necessity of competition, while those
who have put their labor into supplies which they contribute to the
common end, and which are clearly nothing but labor in another
form, shall be required to compete, while he who attempts to combine the labor and materials of others into a finished product to
which he has contributed his own labor, skill and business foresight,
is condemned as a criminal and punished accordingly, if, instead
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of competing in the open market for a purchaser, he attempts to
pursue the methods which labor demands as lawful for itself. Both
situations cannot be right or just, and the reasons, for example,
which are alleged for such discrimination under the Sherman Act
and the Clayton Act do not approve themselves to the impartial mind.
This question of the apportionment of wages is obviously one
of very great difficulty. If it is not to be settled by the contract of
the parties, or by contract plus such influences as labor unions can
bring to bear, it must be settled by some outside authority. Many
schemes have, of course, been suggested: fixing all wages by law,
prescribing a minimum -wage, leaving it to experts, creating wage
boards with coercive or merely persuasive powers, and the like.
Practically all of these have been tried in various countries or are
being tried. Some of them seem to offer valuable possibilities; but
it is a very significant thing that the one which, on the face of it,
seems to offer the most flexible and efficient aid, namely, the wages
board, "is
quite generally repudiated by the very ones it was designed
to aid, namely, the laboring classes, or especially, the labor unions.
In the recent book of Professor Jethro Brown -n the "Underlying
Principles of Modern Legislation", he says: "While a powerful
party in England are fighting for the wages board, an advanced wing
of the labor party in Australia, where experience has been gained
of the working of that institution, is speaking of it with contempt.
A strike is much more exciting and picturesque; and it is proving a
more immediately effective means of raising the rate of wage".
In the last number (Oct.-Dec., 1915) of the Unpopular Review,
an unnamed "Trade Unionist" states why the unions oppose the
wage boards. They "would embarass the organization of labor",
"clip the wings of the unions", and "restrict the opportunities of labor
to voice its demands in its own Way". "A wage board considers
what capital can pay. This is not the business of a union". Aside
from these objections, it is also urged that the boards are unrepresentative and that their minimum wages tend to become the maximum. What labor unions wish, declared one of their leaders recently, according to the public press, is not the securing of their
demands through le'islation, but merely the removal by legislation
of such legal restraints as would prevent the unions from securing
their ends by their own means.
. It is frequently asserted at the present day that one of the socalled rights, which justice demands shall be accorded to the individual, is the right by labor to have and acquire the essential conditions of existence. Whatever may be thought about so-called
nattiral rights in general, there would seem to be no difficulty in
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agreeing that some such right as this could safely be asserted. The
question, however, at the outset, is what it means. It may mean,
for example, that justice requires that every man shall be given a
free and equal opportunity to earn his living in the world by his own
efforts if he can find work to do. In general, this is what in the
past has been deemed to be the nature of the right. That a given
man may not always be able to find work to do, or by it to secure the
essentials of life, is one of the possibilities of the conditions under
which the struggle for existence in the past has been carried on.
That it is not in many cases a very productive right under actually
existing conditions can not be denied. In contrast with this situation,
what in these days has often been denominated the "new justice" or
"social justice" asserts a radically different purpose. Not only has a
man the right to labor if he can find work to do, but it is the duty
of Society or the State to see that adequate labor is supplied him,
or, if not, to support him at the public expense. How such a proposal
looks when put into words may be seen from the terms of a bill
recently urged for adoption in the English House of Commons.
"Where a workman has registered himself as unemployed it shall
be the duty of the local employment authority to provide work for
him in connection with one or other of the schemes hereinafter provided or otherwise; or, failing the provision of work, to provide
maintenance should necessity exist, for that person and for those
depending on that person for the necessities of life; provided that a
refusal on the part of the unemployed workman to accept reasonable
work upon one of these schemes of employment, upon conditions not
lower than those that are standard to the work in the community,
shall release the local unemployment authority of its duties tinder
this section".
Much nearer home than this, the State of Idaho has actually
enacted - "Right to work" law. Under this law it is provided that
any citizen who has lived in Idaho for six months and in the county
for ninety days, and who shows that he can not find other employment and has less than $I,ooo in property, may demand and the
public authorities must provide him with work upon the highways,
though not more than sixty days work may be demanded in any
one year.
However sound such proposals as this may be, they certainly suggest interesting reflections. If, for example, every man has a right
to demand work or support from the State, when andwhere does
justice permit him to claim it? May he choose his own time and
place? May the newly arrived immigrant, who has left his native
land for reasons satisfactory to himself, select Omaha or Chicago
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as the place at which he will demand his right, without any consultation with the authorities concerning this selection? If we, in the
United States, are bound to furnish work to all, does justice require
that our doors be opened without restriction to the adventurous or
needy of all nations? And if society is to undertake this burden,
have the proponents contemplated or considered not only what is the
principle of justice involved, but also how the principle will work
in view of the enormous changes and increases in our governmental
machinery,-with all the inevitable consequences of politics, favoritism, graft and corruption,-which will be necessary before society
can equip itself with the means and instrumentalities for supplying
work to every comer?
But the demands of the new justice do not stop with the insistence
that the State shall provide labor where the individual is not able
to provide it for himself. It goes much further. The doctrine "To
every man according to his need", required that (to use actual illustrations recently put forward by the proponents of this principle)
if the individual needs medical or surgical care and is not able to
provide it for himself, the State or Society shall furnish it for him.
If the child of a poor man falls ill and there is need for a specialist
or perhaps a numbefr of specialists, whose compensation the poor
man is unable to pay, it is the duty of the State or of Society to see
that such expert services are provided. Many other suggestions of
the same sort are constantly being made. For the present I do notmean to question any of these proposals, and indeed, I am personally
in entire sympathy with a considerable number of them. I simply
mean to call attention to some of the considerations that are involved
if we are to put them into effect within the near future. There are
involved, for example, all of the difficult and puzzling questions, upon
which we are by no means agreed, as to vhat we mean by the State
or by Society; what are its functi6hs and what are its resources. If
Society or the State is simply the aggregation of all of us, then the
proposal is that all of us shall supply each o-f us with what each of
us needs and can not otherwise acquire. Inasmuch as the State
under its present form of organization has no independent sources
of revenue and must derive everything from taxation, it means that
all tax-payers shall be taxed to supply those who need; and, since
the proportion of those who pay any direct taxes, to those who do
not, is very small, a few are to be taxed to supply the possible needs
of a very large number. The only alternative is that of the new
member of the legislature in the apocryphal story who proposed that,
since taxes were such a burden, no taxes should be levied, and when
asked how the expenses of the goverfment would be borne under
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such a scheme, replied that it was very easy :---"Simply pay them out
of the State Treasury". Seriously, however, the only alternative
is a considerable if not a complete reorganization of society in such
a manner as will give the state larger revenues and more direct access
to the wealth of the community. Such reorganization is of course
already demanded in many quarters. Many schemes for it have been
proposed. Some of them seem moderate and workable, others are
more extreme. That the State shall take over, control and operate
all of the industrial enterprises of the community, is a proposal frequently urged. Into the obvious difficulties and complications of such
an extension of the State's functions, the present occasion does not
furnish the time or the opportunity to inquire. But certainly it is
pertinent to consider whetther the capacity which our public political
authorities have thus far shown for the honest, efficient and economical management of business enterprises, or the sense of justice 'which
the public has displayed in attempting to regulate and control the
property interests of individuals and corporations, is such as to
justify us, in the near future, in entering upon such enormous and
important undertakings as these more extreme schemes contemplate,
and especially whether, in the long run, justice is likely to be promoted or retarded thereby.
Another point at which it is urged that our existing system works
injustice is the matter of our inheritance laws. It is contended that,
whatever justice may require with respect to private ownership of
land or other property during the lifetime of the individual who has
acquired it, justice does not demand that it shall go in unlimited
quantities to those who have done nothing to earn it and whose claim
to merit or desert with reference to if could not be discovered. With
much of this contention I am entirely in accord. With the practice
prevailing in some States, for example, of creating long time trusts
for the accumulation of vast sums of money for the benefit of those
who become a mere idle, luxurious and self-indulgent class, no sensible person can have much sympathy. One of the proposals for
remedying the evils of inheritance is an inheritance tax. Several
states now have such taxes, and a proposal to enact a federal inheritance tax is said to be upon the program for the present session
of Congress. Much discussion is also 'being had in the public press,
respecting the advantages of such a tax. However much one may
be in sympathy with such a measure, many of the proposals that
are advanced can not fail to arouse apprehension.
The original and fundamental purpose of all taxation has been
supposed to be-to derive revenue for the necessary and proper expenses of the government. In addition'to that, the theory has been

HeinOnline -- 14 Mich. L. Rev. 380 1915-1916

AN INQUIRY CONCERNING JUSTICE

381

established that taxation may be resorted to, not primarily for the
purpose of revenue, but for the purpose or repressing or destroying
particular activities or forms of property which are thought to be
undesirable. A Federal tax upon state bank notes to prevent their
circulation, or a State tax upon the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors to repress activity in those lines, are familiar illustrations. That such a principle involves the possibility of grave abuses
requires no argument to prove. To declare unlawful and contraband
today what yesterday was lawful and legitimate can only be justified
by the stress of very unusual conditions.
Proposals for an inheritance tax, however, are not infrequently
based upon an entirely different theory, namely, that taxation may
be resorted to as a purely social measure, not to raise necessary
revenue, but to "reduce swollen fortunes", equalize ownership, and,
in general, to "even up" the inequalities of fortune which have been
developed under our form of social organization. In such a proposal, to be applied by those who have no swollen fortunes to those
who have, there lurk many opportunities for injustice.
The question, moreover, of what shall be done with the proceeds
of a Federal inheritance tax is worthy of consideration. If such a
tax were applied upon the basis frequently proposed, it would bring
into the Federal treasury a vast sum of money. Moreover, since it
would not ordinarily be -wise to insist upon payment in cash where
this would involve the forced sale of large quantities of securities,
the tax would usually be collected in the securities themselves; and
the Federal government would thus become the holder of large
amounts of corporate securities which it must hold until they could
be disposed of under fair circumstances. Not only would this make
the government a partner in many corporate enterprises, but it at
once raises the question, What shall be done with the fund produced?
A number of writers in the public press have, within the last few
weeks, discussed the subject, and offered various solutions. I cannot
here discuss them. But it is obvious to suggest that no great gain
in justice will follow if the only result of such a tax shall be to add
to the sums which an already extravagant Congress may expend
upon unwise and improvident measures, or distribute as "pork"
among hungry constituents.
It was originally the theory, and not infrequently the fact, that
those who voted taxes were the ones who would have to pay them,
and in this theory and fact was found a preventive of unjust and
oppressive levies. One of the striking evils, however, of the present
time is found in the fact that, in large centers of population particularly, the sifuation has largely come to be that one class votes the
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taxes for another class to pay. Like income taxes with a large
exemption, it may easily come to be that the great mass of the com-munity impose burdens which should be common, upon a small
minority unable to resist them. As stated recently by President
Tucker, in the Atlantic Monthly, "Few will question the justice of
a cumulative tax, even at a high rate of progression, but surely a
tax is far from being democratic which altogether exempts the vast
majority of property holders, reaching under the present law but
one half of one per cent of the whole population. In any conscientious interpretation of democracy it ought to be as humiliating to
the average citizen to be exempt from taxation as to be passed over
in the call to arms for the defense of the country".
The whole situation may be illustrated by a statement I recently
heard from a prominent member of one of our legislative bodies.
When one member of a committee, which was considering a proposed
measure, objected that the whole scheme was unwise and unnecessary; that the amounts involved were extravagant; and that the
salaries to be paid to the incumbents of the proposed offices were out
of proportion to the service to be rendered, the reply -was, "Why do
d particular? It isn't our money we are
we need to be so dspending".
This criticism, moreover, is not confined to this particular field.
The tendency in every field of so-called reform, to establish burdens
for others to bear, to impose liabilities upon the few for the benefit
of the many, and generally to regulate the lives and conduct of other
people but not of ourselves, is one of the most alarming characteristics of the age. The easy and cheerful manner in which many of
our light-hearted reformers propose to destroy -legally created interests, abolish existing institutions, and overturn traditions which
have their roots deep down in the 'sources of human experience, is
not only startling in itself, but indicative of what an immature and
irresponsible demand for change may do when once it "turns itself
loose". Many changes are bound to come. Some of them will
doubtless work for justice. Our problem will be to see that, in doing
what is thought to be justice to some, we do not do equal or greater
injustice to others who are no less meritorious. What we need in
these days is, to use the language of a distinguished university president, less organized emotion and more organized intelligence. Herein, I venture to think, is to be found an opportunity for the intelligent and enlightened profession to which you belong.
FLOYD R. MECHIW.
The University of Chicago,
The Law School.

HeinOnline -- 14 Mich. L. Rev. 382 1915-1916

